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The CJEU has recently ruled
in the case of  USDAW and B.
Wilson v VW Realisation 1 Ltd
(in liquidation), Ethel Austin Ltd,
and the Secretary of state for
Business, Innovation and Skills1
on how the meaning of
“establishment,” as used in the
Collective Redundancies
Directive,2 should be interpreted
in the EU. The Directive is aimed
to approximate Member State
laws on procedures for making
large scale redundancies to afford
greater protection to workers
through consultation obligations
when at risk of  redundancy due to
an employer’s financial problems.
However, the Directive is also
designed to take into account the
need for balanced economic and
social development within the
EU.3
Collective redundancies are
often required in corporate rescue
and insolvency situations; as such,
the application of  the Directive is
a relevant consideration for
insolvency practitioners. Its effects
can impact on insolvency
outcomes due to the social costs
of  the Directive and, at times,
compensation for failure to
comply with its obligations
required from the company in
financial distress.
The Directive allowed for two
different frameworks in
implementation. Most
Continental jurisdictions have
chosen to implement the Directive
by utilising some version of
Article 1(1)(a)(i), in which case the
Directive would apply if  at least
10 redundancies were to be made
over a period of  30 days in
establishments employing between
20 and 100 workers; at least 10%
of  the workers in establishments
employing between 100 and 300
workers; or at least 30 workers in
establishments employing 300 or
more workers. In the other option
provided in Article 1(1)(a)(ii), the
Directive would apply if  over a
period of  90 days at least 20
employees were to be made
redundant, regardless of  the
number of  employees at the
establishment in question. The
UK opted for the second version
of  the Directive’s provisions. 
The Directive was
implemented in the UK through
the Trade Union and Labour
Relations (Consolidation) Act of
1992 and it specifies that for the
provisions to apply, the relevant
redundancies must occur at one
establishment. The single
establishment requirement was
added in the UK implementation
and has come to cause
controversy in the meaning of
“establishment.” In the
Woolworths Case,4 a UK
Employment Appeal Tribunal
(EAT) sought to mitigate the
restrictive nature of  the UK
implementation in the light of
what it perceived were the
purposes of  the Directive. 
During the Woolworths
insolvency, redundancies were
made at a number of  individual
stores, but no consultation was
undertaken. An Employment
Tribunal (ET) application was
made for a protective award for
failure to consult with the affected
employees. The ET found that the
individual stores were
“establishments” for the purpose
of  the collective redundancies
provisions. However, as many of
the individual establishments were
small, fewer than 20 redundancies
were made, so that collective
consultation provisions would not
apply. The result was that the
redundancy of  approximately
4,500 Woolworths and Ethel
Austin employees would be
deemed not to require
consultation and would not
benefit from a protective award. 
The EAT found that the ET
definition of  establishment was
too restrictive and led to results
that failed to satisfy the purposes
of  the Directive to protect
employees at risk of  redundancy,
applying the Marleasing5
interpretative requirements. The
EAT proceeded to define
“establishment” in such a way as
to ensure that the Directive would
have the broadest effect. It
aggregated the establishments of
a company, ignoring the “one
establishment” wording in the
Act, thereby bringing more
employees under the protection of
collective consultation and
satisfying the purposes of  the
Directive as the EAT perceived
them. 
The opinion of  the Advocate
General (AG)6 in three cases
dealing with the definition of
“establishment,” including the
broad interpretation the UK took
in Woolworths, was that it must
have a consistent meaning
regardless of  the impact that this
may have on the Directive’s
effectiveness to protect employees.
The AG noted that
“establishment” had previously
been defined in the Rockfon case7
and followed in Athinaiki,8 as the
unit to which the redundant
employees are assigned to carry
out their duties, a definition that
benefitted the affected workers in
those cases. 
The AG noted that while this
previous case law has only
considered Article 1(1)(a)(i), a
different approach to (ii) should
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not be necessary, and would
indeed create legal uncertainty.
Following the AG’s opinion, the
CJEU also opted in favour of
coherency over perceived fairness.
Uniformity of  interpretation aids
in increasing transparency and
foreseeability for employers who
choose to restructure. The CJEU
also determined that if  a different
definition were applied, this would
cause a major difference between
jurisdictions opting for different
implementation frameworks,
which would be contrary to the
need to promote approximation
of  Member State laws in this area.
The diverse interpretation of
establishment would result in
worker protection that was not
comparable among other
Member States.
The UK Court of  Appeal is
expected to overturn the EAT
decision and revert back to the
original ET decision. Thus the
Woolworths and Ethel Austin
workers will be left with no
recourse under the Collective
Redundancy Directive. While
these companies and their
administrators and liquidators
may be breathing sighs of  relief  at
this result, this brings into the
spotlight the fact that EU
Member States retain very
different views on how much
social protection should exist in
corporate insolvency. Many
jurisdictions have implemented
the Directive within the first
framework, but with far lower
thresholds which, were they
applied in the UK cases, would
bring those employees within the
remit of  the Directive. 
Thus while the CJEU
decision adds legal certainty to the
definition of  establishment, it may
also mean quite different
outcomes for workers depending
on their jurisdiction’s choice of
implementation. The UK has
been given great flexibility on how
to apply its collective redundancy
provisions, pending the result of
the Court of  Appeal. For cross
border insolvencies, particularly
for large retail companies, those
jurisdictions that have
implemented the Directive
according to Article 1(1)(a)(ii), or
otherwise have higher thresholds
for the Directive’s application
than other Member States, will
benefit from greater flexibility in
the dismissal of  employees during
restructuring. 
The thresholds of  the
Directive were also intended to
offer some relief  for SMEs. It
would be difficult to classify either
Woolworths or Ethel Austin as an
SME. Thus there is a question as
to whether or not the thresholds
have been used to benefit the
wrong entities. If  the underlying
aim is to strike a balance between
the protection of  employees and
reduced social costs for smaller
businesses, is it not unfair to allow
large companies to benefit at the
expense of  thousands of
employees?
Differences in
implementation affect procedural
matters relating to employees in
different jurisdictions, but can also
negatively affect employee morale
and cooperation, leading to
potential obstacles to what might
otherwise be smooth restructuring
processes. A more cohesive EU
law of  collective redundancies
may indeed be called for to
mitigate these potential adverse
effects on the Common Market,
as well as the potentially unfair
use of  the available thresholds to
protect large retail establishments
who happen to have small shops
under their wing that can sneak
under those thresholds.  
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